Home Scouting Report

Friday, July 3, 2015

Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes                                             Friday, July 2, 2015

     Today feels like a remake of Groundhog Day, Bill Murray trapped as a commentator on CNBC over and over for the monthly release of the same employment stats. But there is more in this week’s news than meets the woodchuck’s eye.
     Jobs up (223,000). Incomes not (hourly wages flat in June, up 2.0% year over year). Unemployment down (more Americans escaping the workforce, possibly tunneling beside the woodchuck to the underground cash economy). Manufacturing is doing better (June ISM to 53.5 from 52.8). Manufacturing is also doing worse (factory orders down 1% in May, revised down .7% in April).
     Add to that established pattern: a long weekend ahead with an unknown Greek gift on Sunday, so today money has gone to bonds for safety, rates down a little from yesterday. Had we gotten a better employment report, rates would have spiked today, Greece or no Greece. Bonds are now in a state of coiled tension, anticipating Fed liftoff in September. Up to that point, all makes some sense, if only by repetition month after month. But the repetition conceals deep uncertainty and contradiction.
     At the Fed, speakers close to Chair Yellen hint that they would have lifted from 0% by now if it weren’t for the odd weakness last winter. Their urgency is plain, partly for bubble-interception, but mainly for the oldest of all their reasons to take away the punch bowl: if workers become sufficiently scarce, sooner or later wages will rise. And the Fed gives only passing mention to conditions ex-US.
     A few at the Fed see signals of rising incomes, despite the BLS-zilch today. All still speak of “normalizing” the Fed funds rate between 3.5% and 4%, which would mean mortgage rates 6%-plus, not survivable for many years, not without rising incomes. The Fed is prepared to begin normalizing -- tightening, no matter how euphemized -- while every other central bank on Earth is adding to emergency easing.
     The Fed has its logic, but reality intrudes. The US economy was vulnerable to wage-price spirals from 1945 until about 1995, but in that interval also largely free of labor competition from overseas (exceptions: the cheapest manufactures, and Japanese cars). In the last 20 years, overseas competition has crushed US workers.
     China quintupled national credit outstanding in an emergency effort to escape the Great Recession. It escaped, but still has that debt, and is now in an emergency effort to re-balance its economy from runaway spending on infrastructure to a modern consumer economy. Last winter China began corporate privatization via opening its stock markets. Since October the Shanghai Composite leapt from 2,000 to 5,000, margin debt quintupling (that word again); new credit limitation in a month collapsed it to 4,000; and Sunday a fearful People’s Bank of China adopted its most extreme easing ever. The Shanghai is still sinking. More for ego and “reserve currency” pretense than common sense, China last winter did not devalue versus the dollar along with the rest of the world. But it cannot maintain PBoC emergency ease and a dollar peg simultaneously, not with the Fed in bolt-headed determination to tighten.
     Then, all media are soaked in Greece, but 99% of stories are off the point. Two points: how Europe got into this mess, and the consequences.
     Entry: when peripheral Europe joined Germany on the deutschemark-euro, the conversion exchange rate was too rich, which made the periphery (including France) feel rich and spend without behaving like Germans. Which was why they joined. The Germans, incredibly, expected the others to reform themsleves while simultaneously refusing to reform its own trade and budget surpluses. Nearly all “analysis” tries to assign blame. Give it up. ALL are to blame and deserve each other.
     Consequences. Markets trade in fear of weekend surprises, and instability. That is the European problem: consequences are unknowable.
     If you’re game for sweating the unknowable, stick with the big one: central-banking Groundhog Day. Nobody knows the risks in a central-bank dependent world, whether continuing emergency ease, stopping, or doubling down.

Friday, June 26, 2015

Progress Lost :-(


Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes                                          Friday, June 26th, 2015

Here at the turn of the year, days getting shorter, time to look ahead — which I am reluctant to do, unable to predict the future. But we can bracket probabilities, and apply a little history. Seven wagers on the future follow below.
New economic data this week were limited, but positive. Sales of existing homes in May rose 9.2% year-over-year, and prices with them, up 7.9%. Personal income gained .5%, and spending surged .9% (possibly suspect); and the core personal consumption expenditure deflator (PCE, the Fed’s favorite measure of inflation) stayed at 1.2% year-over-year. Only new orders for durable goods were tepid, up .5% for May but down 2.2% year-over-year, clearly suppressed by the hot dollar.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has an odd protocol for releasing the all-important employment statistics each month: the program calls for release on the first Friday each month, but often delayed if the first day of a month falls on Friday. However, the BLS is oblivious to holiday weekends, like next week: we’ll get June data next Thursday, which in thin pre-holiday markets guarantees an explosive response to a surprise in the data. Only the very brave should float a mortgage rate into Thursday.
Which leads to the future. Which is already here: the 10-year T-note today trades at 2.48%, up more than a half-percent from last winter’s lows. Mortgages always follow 10s, which have pushed vanilla 30-year loans with low fees to about 4.25%.
The only meaningful questions for the rest of the year are versions of “How high is up?” How much of the long-term rate jump in the last 90 days is front-running Fed liftoff? Or is the bond market behind, just now catching up?
Then the painful branch of inquiry: At what point will higher mortgage rates slow housing? And will that pinch then constrain the Fed?
It has been so long since the Fed tightened that the young have no feel for mechanics. From here forward, as the Fed normalizes, think “yield curve.” Every day. The yield curve is the graphic description of the spread between the Fed’s overnight cost of money and the 10-year. The two move together only by temporary accident, and changes in the slope of spread are the best single guide to the future.
Historically, long-term rates do front-run the Fed, rising before it begins a tightening cycle and then rising through the cycle. The volatility in long-term rates in the up-cycle is directly proportional to uncertainty about the speed of tightening and its ultimate extent. Bet on this, first: most of the long-rate jump since March has been a correction of an overdone drop, and bonds are just beginning to anticipate the Fed.
Bet on this, second: the Fed is coming. September is in the can unless economic data weaken a lot. The Fed will not wait for inflation to rise to target, nor for further increases in incomes. Third bet: volatility will be big because nobody including the Fed knows how hard they’re coming. Their first marker: the reaction to liftoff. If hysterical, they’ll cool it. If routine, they’ll proceed. No way to know in advance, especially as bond-market capacity for self-deception is European in extent (sidebar: this week’s pop in the 10-year tells me that Greece is off market radar, an unspeakably silly exercise which will not stay the Fed’s hand).
Fourth bet: bond-market complacency at this moment is epic. The US economy appears self-sustaining. The developed world is also heating — a reckoning someday for extreme central bank rescues, but at the moment the rescues have traction.
Long-term rates must enjoy a positive spread versus the cost of money during any economic expansion phase, if only as a buffer to further tightening. The end of every tightening phase is marked by an “inversion,” short rates over long, as bond investors bet on a recession — hardly likely, now, although the Fed does always overshoot.

Fifth bet: mortgage rates are going up with the Fed, tick for tick, overshooting and then falling back to the Fed’s slope. Sixth: only the strongest housing markets will stay so through next year. Seventh: after its second hike, mortgages 5.00%, the Fed’s life will be very complicated. Lucky seven.

Friday, June 19, 2015

A Little Progress


Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes                                 June 19, 2015

Long-term rates have run up again, now to levels of last fall: mortgages are close to 4.25%, the 10-year T-note cresting Wednesday just under 2.50%. Today, 2.36%.

Possibly fatal stubbornness, but I think most of this up-lurch is a correction from  overreaction last winter, not the threshold of a sustained swoop-up. That may come, but it will require sustained economic data at least as strong as this spring’s revival.

Beginning mid-fall last year, Europe appeared headed into deflation. The ECB would embark on QE, but its effectiveness was very much in doubt. Oil crashed, removing all fear of inflation, and a lot of us discounted its stimulus potential. QE in one form or another spread everywhere outside the US, producing a dollar rocket, which at minimum created buyers for US financial markets (stocks-up rates-down), stimulated all of the export-based economies overseas (that would be all of them), and undercut the US. The icing: the weird US winter slowdown.

All of that has now either reversed or stabilized. Rates up.

Maybe, maybe, maybe at last a genuine turn in the world economy, which will self-reinforce. But the odds are that the great charge of the central bank cavalry has only bought more time, and the deflationary pressures are all still in place, especially overseas — and above all, hyper-competition compressing wages.

In the last two weeks both the IMF and World Bank have downgraded their forecasts for global growth, the latter to just 2.7% for this year.

The aspect without precedent is the divergence between the US and the rest. This certainly would not be the first time the US did better than the rest, even the locomotive for the others. But the divergence among central banks is without precedent, all-out printing over there, and tightening beginning here.

The US is by far the world’s most adaptable economy. That, our greatest strength, can be cruel to our people, more so than political structures overseas can survive. Europe is having an impossible time calibrating its several labor forces to one currency. China is trying to change its engine without slowing the car, fearful that any downturn will expose the Party as the fraud that it is. The Emergings are all in similar soup.

US data has picked up, I think more than just a rebound from another odd winter. The NFIB survey of small business is an especially important indicator, and it has nearly normalized. There are flickers of rising incomes especially at the low end, although compressed incomes for the lower two-thirds of our people are our principal headwind. Defying our fabled flexibility: the runaway cost of health care, acting as an anti-productivity tax, and the same for higher education.

Still, the Fed has to come up from zero. Clue: the IMF is so worried about the effect of liftoff on the dollar, and its effects on the weak Emergings, that it asked the Fed to hold off until next year. The huge dollar rise last winter versus all of the others (or their devaluation versus us — all is relative) was in response to the fact of QE overseas but anticipation of Fed liftoff. QE elsewhere is not going to change much. But nobody knows the moment of Fed liftoff or the slope of increase beyond. Shoot, the Fed doesn’t know.

This liftoff process is going to last a long time, and we should expect BIG volatility in things like mortgage rates. Not just up, but up and down and up. Liftoff is a given, but the future slope of increases is not. Since the Fed is data-dependent — all of its forecasting models worse than useless, misleading — then so are we.

The world is going to stay in a low-rate era so long as competitive pressures cap inflation. In many places, central banks may have to QE-lean against deflation open-ended. However, mortgage rates can ricochet rapidly in the post-bust range, 3.50% to 5.50%. Even a careful, “crawling” Fed pace (Vice-Chair Fischer’s word) of increase in short-term rates will beget wild anticipation in long rates. One month thinking the Fed is coming hard (mortgages up) the next thinking it’s overdone (back down).

As we come out of a place we’ve never been before to a new place we’ve never been before, the bond market will have no bearings. Moving, but busted compass.

Friday, June 12, 2015

End Of The Bleeding?


Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes                                 June 12, 2015

Long-term rates have run up again, now to levels of last fall: mortgages are close to 4.25%, the 10-year T-note cresting Wednesday just under 2.50%. Today, 2.36%.

Possibly fatal stubbornness, but I think most of this up-lurch is a correction from  overreaction last winter, not the threshold of a sustained swoop-up. That may come, but it will require sustained economic data at least as strong as this spring’s revival.

Beginning mid-fall last year, Europe appeared headed into deflation. The ECB would embark on QE, but its effectiveness was very much in doubt. Oil crashed, removing all fear of inflation, and a lot of us discounted its stimulus potential. QE in one form or another spread everywhere outside the US, producing a dollar rocket, which at minimum created buyers for US financial markets (stocks-up rates-down), stimulated all of the export-based economies overseas (that would be all of them), and undercut the US. The icing: the weird US winter slowdown.

All of that has now either reversed or stabilized. Rates up.

Maybe, maybe, maybe at last a genuine turn in the world economy, which will self-reinforce. But the odds are that the great charge of the central bank cavalry has only bought more time, and the deflationary pressures are all still in place, especially overseas — and above all, hyper-competition compressing wages.

In the last two weeks both the IMF and World Bank have downgraded their forecasts for global growth, the latter to just 2.7% for this year.

The aspect without precedent is the divergence between the US and the rest. This certainly would not be the first time the US did better than the rest, even the locomotive for the others. But the divergence among central banks is without precedent, all-out printing over there, and tightening beginning here.

The US is by far the world’s most adaptable economy. That, our greatest strength, can be cruel to our people, more so than political structures overseas can survive. Europe is having an impossible time calibrating its several labor forces to one currency. China is trying to change its engine without slowing the car, fearful that any downturn will expose the Party as the fraud that it is. The Emergings are all in similar soup.

US data has picked up, I think more than just a rebound from another odd winter. The NFIB survey of small business is an especially important indicator, and it has nearly normalized. There are flickers of rising incomes especially at the low end, although compressed incomes for the lower two-thirds of our people are our principal headwind. Defying our fabled flexibility: the runaway cost of health care, acting as an anti-productivity tax, and the same for higher education.

Still, the Fed has to come up from zero. Clue: the IMF is so worried about the effect of liftoff on the dollar, and its effects on the weak Emergings, that it asked the Fed to hold off until next year. The huge dollar rise last winter versus all of the others (or their devaluation versus us — all is relative) was in response to the fact of QE overseas but anticipation of Fed liftoff. QE elsewhere is not going to change much. But nobody knows the moment of Fed liftoff or the slope of increase beyond. Shoot, the Fed doesn’t know.

This liftoff process is going to last a long time, and we should expect BIG volatility in things like mortgage rates. Not just up, but up and down and up. Liftoff is a given, but the future slope of increases is not. Since the Fed is data-dependent — all of its forecasting models worse than useless, misleading — then so are we.

The world is going to stay in a low-rate era so long as competitive pressures cap inflation. In many places, central banks may have to QE-lean against deflation open-ended. However, mortgage rates can ricochet rapidly in the post-bust range, 3.50% to 5.50%. Even a careful, “crawling” Fed pace (Vice-Chair Fischer’s word) of increase in short-term rates will beget wild anticipation in long rates. One month thinking the Fed is coming hard (mortgages up) the next thinking it’s overdone (back down).

As we come out of a place we’ve never been before to a new place we’ve never been before, the bond market will have no bearings. Moving, but busted compass.