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Friday, August 30, 2013

A Little Breather


Captial Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes ****************************Friday August 30th, 2013
Long-term rates stayed about the same this week, mortgages just above 4.50% for most products.
There are many things to write about this week, but the most important news for most Americans is the first retreat from Dodd-Frank toward common sense.
Economic data stayed in-pattern, reasonable growth without acceleration. Overall orders for durables goods fell 7% in July, but excluding volatile orders for airplanes and such gained .6%. Pending sales of homes fell 1.3% in July, but from an improved level. 2nd Quarter GDP was revised up from 1.7% to 2.5% annualized, but net of accounting gyrations still two-ish, way under the Fed’s forecast — as is inflation, barely 1% annualized. Consumer spending and incomes in July rose .1% versus forecast gains of .2% and .3% respectively.
The threat of action against Syria is still suppressing rates, but that won’t last long. A brief hail of Tomahawks won’t change anything, serious regional upset unlikely.
The Fed’s policy shift raising rates here is causing declines in emerging-nation currencies, but that is a perfectly normal self-corrective. US exports just set a new high, which says the dollar was somewhat undervalued, and emerging nations drunk on export demand from China will soon be helped by weaker currencies. The wrecks are wrecks (India, maybe Brazil), and the healthy will be fine (South Korea, Taiwan).
New budget collisions ahead in Congress create anxiety, but even Republicans understand that the nation is flat bored with the hysterical behavior of the teapots. A fall fizzle is more likely than a run over the brink.
All the above is minor-league today compared to excellent news for the country: six regulators agreed that the central mortgage provisions of Dodd-Frank are bad ideas. Dodd-Frank tried to define permissible mortgages, the Qualified Mortgage and Qualified Residential Mortgage. The QM standard would be a safe harbor for lenders, protection against claims of misbehavior, and the tighter QRM the benchmark for the worst idea to come out of the post-bubble period, the alleged need for lenders to have “skin in the game.” Any non-QRM would have required the lender to retain part of the risk.
Here, six years after mortgage misbehavior stopped cold, we still do not have a national understanding of what happened, laboring in ignorance, score-settling, and the entirely successful effort by Wall Street investment bankers to dodge accountability.
1. Pre-Bubble, every mortgage bank and broker was contractually obliged to repurchase any loan with deficient underwriting, whether it defaulted or not.
2. Commercial banks have always hated mortgage banks and brokers. Banks are ponderous and dim; brokers are light on their feet and live on their wits. Banks have huge balance sheets, brokers are small. Require brokers to grow balance sheets, and — voila! — a tough competitor is dead.
3. Loans against land pre-date Rome. US mortgage underwriting after 1929 was low-default, clear, of record, and did not require reinvention. Loans with small down payments need greater rigor, and with large ones need less, especially if the borrower has assets sufficient to pay off the loan (the latter two types still locked out today).
4. The Wall Street banks did not just buy bad loans 2000-2007, they designed and vacuumed them. They knew exactly what they were doing, the finest credit analysts in the world, and each firm thought it would be able to leave the market just before it blew. None did. The individual decision-makers, perps in suits, still scot-free.
This first pull-back from Dodd-Frank presages more “refinement” of that great legislative spasm, but don’t get your hopes too high. The containment of QM/QRM damage is not an easing of currently over-tight standards, just turning away from more tightening. In blackest comedy, the regulators cited as a principal reason to retreat that credit is already far too tight.
Restoration of common sense will gradually follow rates of default on new loans, by historic standards now almost undetectable.

Friday, August 23, 2013

Little Change This Week


Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes********************************Friday, August 23, 2013
As we approach the end of the traditional, news-starved Silly Season, there are important things going on. And some other things.
Release of the Fed’s July 31 meeting minutes on Wednesday collapsed the last courage in the bond market, 10-year T-notes to 2.90% and low-down, low-fee mortgages to 5.00%. The minutes were incomprehensible, but their failure to pull back from taper of QE3 means that it is still a “go.”
This morning Treasury short-sellers so pleased with themselves got clobbered by word that new home sales had fainted 13.4% in July, and June was revised down by 8%. The 10-year briefly to 2.81%. New home sales are measured by new contracts written, thus these June-July results are the first since mortgage rates jumped 1% from May to June. Correlation is not cause… some of the weakness is due to a shortage of inventory in turn caused by a shortage of credit to developers and builders.
Another upward force on long-term rates has been slightly better reports overseas: purchasing managers have new readings in China and Europe above the break-even 50 mark. This improvement is far more likely to be a temporary wobble than a trend change, but bonds and mortgages require a steady diet of bad economic news. US data continues a modest growth pattern with no sign of acceleration.
The sillies came in two places: the still-running QE debate, and the White House.
The Fed has obviously decided to exit QE as fast as it can, and then to unload what it has bought if it can. Why it is so spooked is mysterious, possibly an aspect of the Bernanke succession to someone who can be confirmed, and who has sufficient admiration of the President to be nominated. Some at the Fed may resemble Alec Guinness at the end of Bridge on the River Kwai (“My God — what have I done?”).
Much as markets are worried about doing without QE, an amazing crowd claims that it didn’t do anything, anyway. I was there, and it saved our sorry patoots. In 2008, as the world neared the Lehman brink, 10-year T-notes fell from 5.25% to 3.75% while mortgage rates rose to 6.50%, the largest spread on modern record. QE1 began in January 2009 and mortgage rates fell 1% in 30 days, 2% in one year.
In May the Fed forecast an end to QE, and mortgage rates rose 1% in 30 days. Yet, at the big Fed conference in Jackson Hole this week, one propeller-head after another says, nope, QE didn’t do a thing.
As QE leaves the scene we are going to find out how well-recovered the financial system is. Early returns are poor despite progress. A great many losses and write-offs are behind us, and a mountain of capital has been raised. Bad credits of the kind inflating the Bubble 2000-2007 are today inconceivable. However, we have empowered a generation of uber-regulators to layer on rules to be sure there will not be a new bubble, and to fireproof banking in general.
Nevermind that you could not today launch a synthetic CDO tranche with a canon, nor that there is no way to create cyclically safe banks. March ever onward to fight the last war! On Monday Mr. Obama called in Bernanke and the heads of the FHFA, CFPB, SEC, CFTC, FDIC, and NCUA to berate them for moving too slowly to enact regulations called for by Dodd-Frank, specifically to emplace the Volcker Rule (ending proprietary trading) and to be certain that by the end of this year all banks could fail. And to raise more capital, and to find fools to buy minimum amounts of long-term bank debt (you, too can be a water-barrel in front of a highway bridge abutment).
Fortunately a stern talking-to is mistaken for action by this White House, but damage is already serious. Since bubble peak in 2007, corporate bonds on bank-dealer balance sheets have fallen 76% (Bloomberg), and the volume of most-basic and secure liquidity (repurchase agreements, mostly of Treasurys) from $7 trillion to $4.6 trillion. Finding counterparties to execute a significant trade used to take minutes, now hours.
Past a certain point, de-risking banks just moves the risk someplace else. A world short on liquidity and credit is just as dangerous as one with too much.

Friday, August 16, 2013

After Boring, Comes Ugly!


Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes                         Friday, August 16th, 2013

Long Treasuries broke upward, out of the trading range of the last eight weeks. Not by much, but out, the 10-year T-note above 2.80% for the first time in more than two years, 2.86% at this moment. Mortgages are stickier, the rise negligible (investors have lost fear of another refi wave), but the march toward 5.00% is underway.
Two patterns are helpful, one 24-hours old, the other a 60-year vintage.
Before discussing those, dismiss a false lead: the 17-nation euro zone enjoyed positive GDP in the 2nd quarter, ballyhooed in US press as an “end to recession.” A positive quarter is the technical definition recession-end, but not even the Europeans believe this is anything more than a passing moment of stabilization.
Yesterday’s trading was instructive. News which should have helped long-term rates did not: Egypt’s descent into civil war, 200 points off the Dow, and zero-gain industrial production in July. News which overwhelmed all else and pushed up rates: new claims for unemployment insurance last week fell to a six-year low 320,000.
Thursdays’ market calculus is now persistent: jobs override all. If employment is strengthening, the Fed will taper QE to zero within six months. Thus stocks traded down on good economic news. I have never found a direct conveyor of QE cash to stocks, except running through the vacant minds of stock boosters. Whether real or imaginary, the mind prevails, but it does not say much for the investment-value underpinnings of stocks that good economic news is bad news.
The trading-desk shorthand for unemployment insurance applications is “claims.” Every US recession since the big war has ended in the same pattern: credit-sensitive housing and autos rebound as soon as the Fed cuts rates. The job market is the last to recover, often lagging housing by two years. Jobs are the most politically sensitive element, which typically forces the Fed to be too easy during recovery for too long — and which the Fed knows as surely as sunrise. Claims have been the best leading indicator for the Fed, but when claims plunge the Fed is already too late, forcing it into catch-up, which many fear today.
The Fed chopped rates in late 2008, but housing did not turn until 2012. Too much distress in the market, and tight credit offset cheap rates. Today, one year into housing recovery, right on schedule jobs are showing signs of life.
However, the job market today has headwinds even stronger than housing. For one, housing will continue to be thin until Congress and the White House take their feet off the mortgage hose. Even more important, since the early 1990s the US has faced unprecedented competition from labor overseas. Median household income had been stuck near $55,000/year from the mid-1990s until 2009 when it fell almost to $50,000, where it still is, and its purchasing power undercut by health-care racketeering.
Claims are down in part because there isn’t anybody left to fire. The drop in claims this time may not have cyclical counterparts: more jobs and higher incomes. The whole point of the Fed’s removing the punch bowl is to prevent overheating and inflation, but we can’t have either one without rising incomes. And they ain’t. And no economy anywhere ever overheated without a surge in credit. Not here, not hardly.
Another historical pattern: when the Fed appears to be turning, long-term rates always rise. And people like me always warn that the rise may abort the recovery, and it never has. This time is different in two ways (maybe). First, the panicked run up in long rates since May is not justified by Fed statements or implications, or by economic data — especially inflation. Too far too fast. Second, can it be that a still-impaired and mis-regulated financial system has been more dependent on QE than we or the Fed have known? Despite falling mortgage production and Treasury issuance, the Fed has been the only buyer, and rates must go much higher to find another?
Then there is the world. As US markets and the Fed conspire to jack long rates, they are rising everywhere. The US economy is better, but everywhere else is slowing or in trouble one way or another. Fainting elsewhere is our best chance for lower rates.

Highest Rates In Over Two Years!