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Friday, June 8, 2012

Lost A Little Ground This Week

Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes              Friday, June 8, 2012                                               

     The world's financial markets now behave like not very bright but exceptionally well-trained seals, barking and clapping their flippers whenever they hear the words, "central bank."
     On Wednesday these circus performers talked themselves into belief in an ECB/European rescue of Spain's banks, and a new QE round by the Fed, and faith that these efforts would work. Dow up 280, 10-year T-note up from all-time bottom one week ago at 1.41% to 1.70%, mortgage borrowers startled by the run-up.
     Two days later, no mackerel from their trainers, the seals are back in the tank. The European end of this is straightforward: no one but Germany can float Europe, but it cannot unless all the rest of Europe accept German discipline, and the ability of non-German economies and societies to adapt is more in doubt every day. Spain needs help, but wants to retain sovereignty, fearful that Europe will do for it what it has done for Greece. In terminology from another time, in order to save the village it became necessary to destroy it. So, wait on a Greek election that doesn't matter, wait on a variety of other meetings and standoffs, wait until something breaks.
     In his first interview with Western media in five years, the Chairman of China's sovereign wealth fund, China Investment Corp's Lou Jiwei (no relation): "There is a risk that the euro zone may fall apart, and that risk is rising." Senior Chinese officials are not given to casual comments, not even once in five years.
     The overall central bank situation is more complicated and indefinite. Herewith an explanatory parable, told to rookies by generations of scarred  merchandise managers.
     The president of a large departments store noticed the extraordinary profitability of household furnishings, and marched with his entourage to the seventh floor to congratulate the manager. That honest person said it was  not her doing, all the work of the young man in charge of lighting fixtures. The parade moved on to his desk.
     The president offered praise, a raise, and promise of promotion, and asked the young man to describe the mechanics of his profitability. "Well, sir, when we have inventory that's not selling I mark it down and get it sold, and to avoid the loss I mark up the prices of the rest of the inventory." More congratulations, and the presidential crowd moved on, but -- one Deputy Assistant caught an elbow on a table lamp and knocked it flying. The young lighting manager leapt through the air, landing flush-and-thud on the tile floor, just in time to catch the lamp before it crashed.
     The president, not known for personal compassion: Good heavens! Your devotion to duty is admirable, but you could have been badly hurt saving an ordinary lamp!
     "Sir, you don't understand. That's the million-dollar lamp."
     The central banks of Europe, the UK, the US, and Japan have since the global, wholesale bank run began in July 2007 increased their aggregate ownership of various government IOUs from $3.5 trillion to $9 trillion. All bought with invented money, and not counting a similarly vast sum of government IOUs held by these banks as collateral; all with the sensible, defensible purpose of putting down the bank run and preventing firesales of assets of all kinds until economies recover.
     Good plan. However, in the aggregate global economies are no closer to recovery now than in 2007. The US is in much better shape, although too weak to pull the rest, all of whom are deteriorating. Why the US is still too weak, and what it might do are questions eluding leadership and most observers. Certainly central: the 20-year undercut of US wages by overseas competition, fair and not.
     But, another, more easily released drag jumps from the pages of the Fed's Z-1 released yesterday. In the first 90 days of 2012, residential mortgage credit contracted by $90 billion, $262 billion year-over-year. Some of course from write-down and foreclosure, but the beneficial effect of record-low rates is strangled by garroted supply and too-high standards. The mania to make banking safe is resulting in a global shortage of credit, making the world safe from economic growth, as well.

Friday, June 1, 2012

What A Difference A Week Makes!

Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes   Friday, June 1st, 2012

Tough day. The details will be media-inescapable; work on context instead.
US job data for May were poor, and April’s revised so. However, jobs are growing, incomes are rising (a paltry 0.2% monthly, but rising), and the NAPM for May arrived 53.5, a little off from April’s 10-month high but a healthy distance above 50 breakeven.
The US concern is delicate: until this newest data there had been good reason to hope that the US locomotive could begin to pull the world; now the chance has risen that global drag may stall us, too. Take heart: that’s a risk, far from a done deal.
The global picture and financial flows have been widely misdescribed — partly from ignorance, partly confusion, partly salespeople trying to rile their herds, and everybody trying to jam a genuinely new situation into old models and experience.
Since the dawn of central banking 135 years ago, the fundamental prescription during an economic meltdown and bank run has been to flood the economy with cash and government guarantees. Since 2007 we have suffered serial bank-on-bank “wholesale” runs, but all-ee same-ee.
The global monetary system has worked to perfection: clearing transactions and currencies, central banks smoothing panic after panic. And those central banks have also deployed the most basic medicine for recovery: knock interest rates to the floor, and promise to keep them there. Low rates stimulate economies, and over time convince investors that holding cash is stupid, and instead to take risk.
All of that is out the window now. Today.
Begin at the beginning: the cash in your wallet is an IOU from a government, and the IOU is as good as that government’s tax revenue versus expenditure over time. “Hard” backing for paper “fiat” currencies — metal, sea shells, whatever — is a primitive and failed means to keep government IOU-issuance under control. The painful and unresolved reality: it is up to us. Nearly all Western democracies began by the 1960s to borrow instead of resolving fiscal disagreement, and gradually lost their safety margin of revenue versus debt service.
There was no telling who or what accident would snap an over-stretched system, and it has turned out to be the misbegotten euro. This week we see the endgame of meltdown-fighting. The ECB has injected several trillion euros into the European banking system — which is still open, no domino closings — but the cash has run through the 17-nation euro zone like grass through a goose. To escape repayment of IOUs in new lira, peseta, and francs, euro out-runners have today bid the German 2-year to a negative yield, hoping for repayment in deutschmarks; and to US 10s not as an investment at 1.46% today, but a liquid place of safety; and to bonds and banks of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the UK… anywhere to get out of the lunatic asylum.
The hard money boys have told us forever that the result of ECB liquidity would be inflation, and exactly the opposite is happening, inflation falling throughout Europe. Zero-percent interest rates that were to drive investors from cash have been unable to stop a stampede to cash. Cries for government guarantees, Germany or somebody, or for more government spending — desperate to continue the failed 50-year game — cannot comprehend the result of faith lost in revenue adequate to pay bills.
The euro is toast, no solution but to break up and let local currencies find levels allowing growth. A fantastic destruction of wealth is underway, inevitable, and social stability at risk. Elsewhere… embrace the lesson! Do not waste Europe’s disaster.
Here, and in China, and in the emerging world we still have time. All face the same chore: focus, pull together, and restructure away from any impediment to economic growth. Drop every cherished notion from China’s state industries to India’s “license Raj” to US regulatory paralysis (all remarkably close cousins). If it’s not productive, drop it — no more “A small price to pay for protecting ____.” Bust up profiteering cartels like health care and higher education. Live within our means, and be competitive in the world, or be Europe.

Saturday, May 19, 2012

How Low Can They Go?

Capital Markets Update

By Louis S. Barnes      Friday, May 18th, 2012

     The few spatters of economic data this week did not change the plod-along US outlook. Meanwhile the priority story (Europe) was obscured by the media's demented focus on the Facebook IPO and the blown trade at Chase.
     Today markets are on exhausted hold, hoping for some miracle at this weekend's G-8 meeting. German 10-year bunds hit all-time-low yields on successive days this week, the bottom at 1.41% while Spanish and Italian equivalents reached 6.38% and 5.91%,respectively. Inflation and deflation camps have been in balanced argument ever since Lehman, as have dollar-fearful and dollar-safe-haveners, but Europe has now tilted the show to deflation: gold has dropped from 1790 to 1590. Those still fearing inflation ran to dollar-denominated inflation-protected Treasurys (TIPS), driving the newest auction to a negative 0.391% yield. Yup, below zero: lose money to be ready for a 1970s replay. It's been forty years, but you never can be too prepared.
     The G-8 gathering will be only seven (Czar Vladimir is busy): unstable Italy; stable for the moment Japan, UK, and France, none in a position to help anybody else; Germany ("Vee vil hit yu mit zis ztick until yu agree to hit yorzelf"); and the US and Canada ("Europe is a rich continent able to solve its own problems"). A new flurry of can-kicking may follow, but European markets are poised to implode before the next Greek election on June 17. Reversing the euro to local currencies would be briefly chaotic, and slow the global economy, but it is the one way to rationalize the economies involved. If Europe had done so two years ago the losses would have been far less than today, or will be tomorrow. The US 10-year fell to its all-time low, 1.70%.
     There are some things to be learned from the Chase pratfall. The Left-side media are ascendant: "EEK! Bankers Found Gambling!" The Right-side doesn't get it (ever): "Private Sector Hurt By Government." Both wrong, of course.
     The great post-Bubble fable holds that we can easily return to the safe banking of yore by removing profiteering bankers and their profits. Wrong three times. The fable rests on memory of US banking from 1933 to roughly 1973, but this period was extremely atypical. The sound regulation and deposit insurance of '33 was followed by a time of such overwhelming US/dollar dominance that banks struggled to lose money. Banks ever since have been in and out of systemic trouble just as ever before.
     Modern economies (since, um…Rome) cannot grow without credit and banks. That means somebody has to bear the risk of monetary alchemy: depositors of all kinds require instantly available cash and a return on that cash, but to earn the return banks must run the risk of credit and illiquid investment. It is possible to run a (nearly) risk-free bank, and we have: the hyper-capitalized silk-stocking affairs who catered to the rich, who wanted only safety and did not care about return, and which provided little credit to the economy. Leaving the 99% out in the cold, as did the great, private, merchant banks, from Rothchilds to the old Wall Street partnerships. Real, beneficial banks must take risks that will go unpredictably bad. Always.
     Chase's blown trade was not a hedge. It was crafted to look like one, in defiance of the spirit behind the misbegotten rigidity of the proposed "Volcker Rule." De-risking spirit is important today, while we are in post-Bubble hysterics, over-tightening credit, and every dumb-assed trick re-ignites the hysterics. However, this trade did not threaten Chase, even at an ultimate $4 or $5 billion loss, nor did it bring systemic risk, nor was it done in the dark. Chase's directors knew, and the on-site Fed team knew (all big banks since 2008 have had on-site Fed teams).
     Perfect punishment is underway. Arrogant Jamie Dimon has a lot less to be arrogant about, and of course should resign. Even if he is not forced out (he has not the grace to do so un-prodded), his day is done, and a warning to the others. There will never be a way to de-risk banks in accordance with the post-Bubble fable; we will have to live with the risk, cycle in, cycle out, one bank after another. The worst error is to build an ever-thicker rulebook, instead of looking for ever-better people.