By Louis S. Barnes Friday June 3, 2011
Poor payrolls in May, another weak Case-Shiller home-price report, and a big deceleration in manufacturing have pushed down hopes, stocks, bond yields, and mortgages, now near 4.50%. However, the data do not support a return to recession: the ISM service-sector index actually improved in May 54.6 from 52.8 in April.
Today’s greatest frustration among mortgage people — worse than all the new and self-defeating rules, worse than volume too low to make a living, worse than turning away good applicants — is to watch the White House, Congress, and financial “experts” of all stripes discuss mortgage-market history, and attempt reinvention.
The Soviets did a more honest job with textbooks. Creationists have a better grasp of evolution. Little kids do better repeating a sentence down a long line of classmates. Daniel Patrick Moynihan: “You’re entitled to your own opinion, but not your own facts.”
None of us wants to see a repeat of Bubble lending. However, our national leadership, which could not see Bubble lending when it was happening, still doesn’t know what it was and who did it. Rather worse, it refuses to distinguish Bubble lending from the prudent standards prevailing from about 1995 back to 1934 (and beyond), and so reinvention has become a suicidal game of over-tightening and score-settling.
These guys, all of them, squirt the heart of the matter around the room like a watermelon seed, most from ignorance, too many on purpose. Really awful political axe-grinders, led by Peter Wallison and Edward Pinto of AEI, have invented this subprime definition: any Fannie-Freddie (“GSE”) ARM of any type, quality immaterial, any fixed-rate loan above 80% of value, any Fico below 660 — subprime!!!
A rose by any other name would smell as sweet. Got that. But names do matter. Hence a brief history of subprime time.
In the beginning, early 1990s, a subprime loan was by definition one that the GSEs would not buy. Sub-prime. Less-than. And the term had the attractive cachet to borrower dopes that its interest rate might be below “prime.” Synonymous subprime terms: “B, C, D” credits, inferior to “A” (I never could figure them out — I couldn’t tell B borrowers from D, and none of them deserved a loan).
At the same time, “Alt-A” lending began on a parallel track: these were “A” loans, but not in the GSE playbook (a rental-property loan in Jumbo amount, for example). Alt-A subsumed prudent “stated-income” loans, the term appearing at S&Ls in 1980, the lending approach as old and solid as dirt: 25%-40% down, fine credit, good story about unusual income, deep and documented post-closing reserves.
In the late ‘90s, the used-to-be-great investment banks discovered that they could securitize trash, trick rating agencies, and sell bad paper at pretend high yields all over the world. Their appetite for subprime and Alt-A loans became ravenous.
By 1997, stated-income required only 20% down, then 10%, and by 2002, nothing. WaMu and World sipped and then sucked the Kool-Aid. The Alt-A book was similarly suborned (Lehman’s ALS, Bear). But the worst, the absolute dead worst: loans subprime by construction, by their terms guaranteed to fail, the infamous 2/28 and 3/27. Fixed for a couple of years, then jump 6% above Libor.
The GSEs had nothing to do with the racketeering described above. They bought a trivial amount of AAA subprime securities, and too many loans with Ficos under 660, about 15% of their total (however, “A-minus” was not subprime). Through 2005 the flood of bad credit perversely caused bad loans to perform, but then they were first to default in waves, causing a whirlpool that has dragged in millions of “A” loans.
Today the GSEs are terrified for their lives, standards over-tightened for political protection. There are no S&Ls, and over-regulated local banks cannot fill the gap. The giant commercial banks have forever hated all other mortgage lenders — embarrassed by them — want the business all their own, but cannot handle the volume, nor carry the paper even when consumers are forced to pay into a new protection racket.
Get the GSEs back in the game, or take the (continuing) consequences.
This chart exposes the Big Lie blaming Fannie and Freddie for the disaster, and another fable: that “private” mortgage markets are the sloution. “PLS” = Private Label Securities; note early-default whirlpool.
Friday, June 3, 2011
Friday, May 27, 2011
Capital Markets Update
By Louis S.Barnes Friday, May 27, 2011
Events European and domestic have conspired to push the Almighty Indicator to its lowest level in six months: the 10-year T-note has broken to 3.05%.
April data still arriving shows a substantial air pocket, which the usual suspects discount as the temporary effect of gasoline prices and supply-chain disruptions after Japan's 3/11. There's more to it than that: the Chicago Fed's national index dropped from +.32 in march to -.45 in April, and -.70 would signal new recession. 1st quarter GDP was widely expected to be revised up from 1.8% but was not, and the consumer spending account was revised down a half-point. Last week's new unemployment claims were supposed to unwind a quirky rise, but popped up to 424,000.
The song on the broken record here: housing. April pending home sales tanked 11% (versus -1% forecast), down 26% year-over year. The FHFA reported that as of March, homes in 47 states plus DC had lost value in the last year, and national prices are back to 2003 levels. Housing is not waiting for jobs; this economy cannot heal when the entire nation is worried about its most important asset.
Europe. To understand this moment in Europe, watch HBO's new "Too Big To Fail." The presentation is better than the book -- better than any of the books or news shows describing the run-in to Lehman and AIG. The splendid cast nails the characters, and conveys the visceral fear that overtook each of these immensely powerful personae.
Two key lessons: How could these people not see the dominoes lined up behind each one as it went down? Second, although none of the players today gets a shred of credit, at the last possible minute, under stress found only in combat (and even there, you get to shoot back) they found the wisdom and courage to set a firebreak.
Many Americans, maybe most, still doubt the need for that firebreak, dismissing the whole post-Lehman affair a bailout of banks and the rich. Most Europeans today are in the same spectacular self-serving denial and ignorance.
The analog, Europe to Lehman, is cover-your-eyes close. The Western financial system failed in July 2007, descending into the greatest bank run of all time, institution-on-institution. The Fed for the next 14 months used every imaginable tool to support the system, but only bought time until the dominoes ran their course: Fannie and Freddie at Labor Day 2008, followed in a fortnight by Lehman, then instantly by AIG. Perfesser Bernanke told Paulson that the Fed was exhausted, and Congress would have to supply cash. Congress did, in time; and Bernanke and Paulson found the clarity and guts to pour $100 billion into the filthy hole of AIG to stop the run.
The euro experiment failed last year. Insolvent Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have been supported by the European Central Bank, which has bought their bonds and accepted them as collateral from their banks. The ECB last week said that it is at its limit, exposed to some $300 billion of Club Med IOUs. Any "restructuring" will make the ECB insolvent, needing many billions of pan-European taxpayer money to re-capitalize.
The other dominoes are lined up: Spain with 45% unemployment of those aged 29 and younger, and a gaping hole in its banking system, Italy the most indebted of all, 120% of GDP. The dominoes are linked, just as here, by banks packed with each others' sovereign paper. Soon, perhaps very soon, Europe will have to decide whether to firebreak outside Greece, or let that hopeless case go as we did Lehman.
If Greece is let go, as an object lesson and a hole too big versus benefit, Europe will instantly face its dominoes: re-capitalize its banks and the ECB to cover the Greek loss, picking up something like $1.5 trillion in Club Med paper, or....
Germany's call. Say to hell with it. German taxpayers cover German banks, and go back to some version of deutschemark with any nation that can afford our company.
Whichever way Germany goes, firebreak or sauve qui peut, cash is already running to the US for safety. Either way, the European economy slows and slows the world, deflation back in play, interest rates to the floor.
Notes to charts, which are nothing short of incredible. These show two separate accounts: 90-day-plus delinquencies not yet in foreclosure, and homes in foreclosure process. Adding the left scales, together there are roughly four million homes headed for distressed resale. This total does NOT include homes already foreclosed and in REO inventory (large debate about that group, somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000)
In the top chart the color-coded aging-scale reflects how long a loan has been 90-days or more delinquent: purple = one year or more, 40% of total (!). In the second chart the coding shows the time in foreclosure process, no payments made, but not yet taken in foreclosure: amber = 24+ months, 31% (!!). www.calculatedriskblog.com.
Events European and domestic have conspired to push the Almighty Indicator to its lowest level in six months: the 10-year T-note has broken to 3.05%.
April data still arriving shows a substantial air pocket, which the usual suspects discount as the temporary effect of gasoline prices and supply-chain disruptions after Japan's 3/11. There's more to it than that: the Chicago Fed's national index dropped from +.32 in march to -.45 in April, and -.70 would signal new recession. 1st quarter GDP was widely expected to be revised up from 1.8% but was not, and the consumer spending account was revised down a half-point. Last week's new unemployment claims were supposed to unwind a quirky rise, but popped up to 424,000.
The song on the broken record here: housing. April pending home sales tanked 11% (versus -1% forecast), down 26% year-over year. The FHFA reported that as of March, homes in 47 states plus DC had lost value in the last year, and national prices are back to 2003 levels. Housing is not waiting for jobs; this economy cannot heal when the entire nation is worried about its most important asset.
Europe. To understand this moment in Europe, watch HBO's new "Too Big To Fail." The presentation is better than the book -- better than any of the books or news shows describing the run-in to Lehman and AIG. The splendid cast nails the characters, and conveys the visceral fear that overtook each of these immensely powerful personae.
Two key lessons: How could these people not see the dominoes lined up behind each one as it went down? Second, although none of the players today gets a shred of credit, at the last possible minute, under stress found only in combat (and even there, you get to shoot back) they found the wisdom and courage to set a firebreak.
Many Americans, maybe most, still doubt the need for that firebreak, dismissing the whole post-Lehman affair a bailout of banks and the rich. Most Europeans today are in the same spectacular self-serving denial and ignorance.
The analog, Europe to Lehman, is cover-your-eyes close. The Western financial system failed in July 2007, descending into the greatest bank run of all time, institution-on-institution. The Fed for the next 14 months used every imaginable tool to support the system, but only bought time until the dominoes ran their course: Fannie and Freddie at Labor Day 2008, followed in a fortnight by Lehman, then instantly by AIG. Perfesser Bernanke told Paulson that the Fed was exhausted, and Congress would have to supply cash. Congress did, in time; and Bernanke and Paulson found the clarity and guts to pour $100 billion into the filthy hole of AIG to stop the run.
The euro experiment failed last year. Insolvent Greece, Ireland, and Portugal have been supported by the European Central Bank, which has bought their bonds and accepted them as collateral from their banks. The ECB last week said that it is at its limit, exposed to some $300 billion of Club Med IOUs. Any "restructuring" will make the ECB insolvent, needing many billions of pan-European taxpayer money to re-capitalize.
The other dominoes are lined up: Spain with 45% unemployment of those aged 29 and younger, and a gaping hole in its banking system, Italy the most indebted of all, 120% of GDP. The dominoes are linked, just as here, by banks packed with each others' sovereign paper. Soon, perhaps very soon, Europe will have to decide whether to firebreak outside Greece, or let that hopeless case go as we did Lehman.
If Greece is let go, as an object lesson and a hole too big versus benefit, Europe will instantly face its dominoes: re-capitalize its banks and the ECB to cover the Greek loss, picking up something like $1.5 trillion in Club Med paper, or....
Germany's call. Say to hell with it. German taxpayers cover German banks, and go back to some version of deutschemark with any nation that can afford our company.
Whichever way Germany goes, firebreak or sauve qui peut, cash is already running to the US for safety. Either way, the European economy slows and slows the world, deflation back in play, interest rates to the floor.
Notes to charts, which are nothing short of incredible. These show two separate accounts: 90-day-plus delinquencies not yet in foreclosure, and homes in foreclosure process. Adding the left scales, together there are roughly four million homes headed for distressed resale. This total does NOT include homes already foreclosed and in REO inventory (large debate about that group, somewhere between 500,000 and 800,000)
In the top chart the color-coded aging-scale reflects how long a loan has been 90-days or more delinquent: purple = one year or more, 40% of total (!). In the second chart the coding shows the time in foreclosure process, no payments made, but not yet taken in foreclosure: amber = 24+ months, 31% (!!). www.calculatedriskblog.com.
Friday, May 20, 2011
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